

2017 VCE Philosophy examination report

General comments

The 2017 VCE Philosophy examination provided opportunities for students to explore and reflect upon their knowledge. Many students developed insightful responses to the broad style of essay question and utilised their knowledge.

Student responses for Section A suggested that many students struggled to discern precisely what was being asked of them. Careful reading and an open-minded consideration of how philosophical concepts fit within the study are essential. However, many students opted for a broader approach to these specific questions and provided general information about the philosopher or idea in question, without any effort to address the focus of the question. This broader approach to questions was apparent across all sections of the examination, leading to some off-topic, or highly informative but uncritical, responses.

Students must make a point of addressing all aspects of a question, identifying and utilising key language, and developing their responses appropriately in order to avoid misreading or misinterpretation. Students were often challenged by questions that required critical reasoning or the development of a distinct position, and there appeared to be minimal effort given to justify ideas and arguments.

Most students wrote complete responses to the essay section of the examination but numerous students did not provide responses to some questions.

Specific information

Note: Student responses reproduced in this report have not been corrected for grammar, spelling or factual information.

This report provides sample answers or an indication of what answers may have included. Unless otherwise stated, these are not intended to be exemplary or complete responses.

The statistics in this report may be subject to rounding resulting in a total more or less than 100 per cent.

Section A

Responses to Section A demonstrated that many students found the precise phrasing of the questions difficult to approach. Moreover, it was clear from the number of unanswered questions that there were particular terms, central to the Philosophy study design and the prescribed texts, with which students were unfamiliar.

Question 1

A range of responses was accepted for each part of this question; however, students needed to be consistent in the development of their answers. Questions that are divided into parts are considered to have a relationship and this meant that responses to Question 1a. and Question 1c.

needed to have a common thread (the latter developing upon the distinction drawn in the former). The same applied for Question 1b. and Question 1d.

Question 1a.

Marks	0	1	Average
%	24	76	0.8

Students drew on several distinctions that Descartes makes in the support of dualism, the most obvious being the distinction between the mind and the body. Responses that drew on ideas that Descartes discusses that do not relate to a dualistic stance – for example, the distinction between solid and liquid wax – were not considered to have answered the question.

Question 1b.

Marks	0	1	Average
%	24	76	0.8

Similar to Question 1a., Question 1b. required students to provide a distinction that Socrates appeals to in the development of dualistic stance, the most obvious being the distinction between the soul and the body. Students who drew on corporeal/incorporeal and other Affinity Argument delineators satisfied the question. Those who chose distinctions that did not relate to Socrates's dualistic stance – for example, the distinction between hot and cold – were not addressing the question.

Question 1c.

Marks	0	1	2	Average
%	37	31	32	1

Many students handled this question well, providing a clear argument that Descartes made use of and relating it directly to the distinction mentioned in Question 1a. However, many made the mistake of thinking that the question merely required an overview of one of Descartes' arguments. The question phrasing, asking for an argument 'that makes use of his distinction', meant that there was an additional, yet essential, step for answering this question. Descartes makes only one true argument for the distinction between the mind and the body and that is in Meditation Six where he refers to the mind as a 'thinking, non-extended thing' and the body as an 'extended, non-thinking thing' capable of being separated, at least by God, effectively demonstrating their distinct qualities and thus providing an argument for dualism.

Very few students utilised this argument. The majority of answers drew on the Wax Argument and various sections of Cartesian Scepticism as expressed in Meditation One. The problem with these arguments was that they do not reach a dualistic conclusion in and of themselves, and only students who took the time to extrapolate how the distinction drawn in Question 1a. was reached as a result of the implications of these arguments could be awarded full marks.

Question 1d.

Marks	0	1	2	Average
%	31	20	50	1.2

Many of the same problems that were evident in Question 1c. were prevalent in Question 1d. Students selected an array of arguments from the *Phaedo* but many students did not clearly develop them to explain Socrates's distinction between the soul and the body. Additionally, a significant portion of students mistakenly attributed the Argument for Attunement to Socrates.

Question 2a.

Marks	0	1	2	Average
%	39	28	33	1

While there were some high-scoring answers to this question, students were often confused about what was being asked of them. A student needed to provide a clear explanation of how Locke differentiates between identity for animals/humans and identity for persons, and explain how this differed from the way Hume understood identity for animals/humans and persons. For Locke, the position is that an animal/human possesses a physical identity (the identity of Man), which refers to their appearance, whereas for something to be a person it requires a continuity of consciousness over time supported by memory. Hence, because we cannot bear witness to the consciousness or memories of an animal, it will only ever possess physical identity to us, the observer. Hume, on the other hand, makes no such distinction. Instead, he highlights the transient nature of identity as a whole, detailing how it is merely a bundle of perceptions in perpetual flux. This effectively gives animals and humans the same degree of personhood – that of a momentary identity that does not continue over time.

The following is an example of a high-scoring response:

Locke believes that for animals and humans, identity is gauged through the physical. For example, if I see a parrot who demonstrates human qualities such as reason, I would still call it a parrot. On the other hand, he says that identity in persons can be found through memory with reference to conscious. In contrast, Hume does not believe that humans or animals have a fixed, continuing identity over time, and with regard to 'persons', says that memory is the cause for the belief in identity (which is a false one as we are just a "bundle of perceptions").

Question 2b.

Marks	0	1	2	Average
%	46	28	27	0.8

Responses to Question 2b. were often undeveloped. Most students had a clear preference for which philosophical position on identity they found more convincing; however, very few students provided much reasoning for their choice. It is not enough to merely express that Hume or Locke is better because their view is 'valid' or 'more applicable to daily life'. Stating that something is valid is not considered a relevant justification. Learning to develop relevant and incisive justification for a position is an essential philosophical skill and students must be aware of the dangers associated with merely elaborating on ideas expressed in Question 2a. without linking those comments to their preference in Question 2b.

Many students opted to preference one position by directly highlighting problems in the alternative. This was a good way to approach the question but students must remember to make sure that their preference is explicit. Failure to clearly give a preference (even if that preference was that neither position provides much value) was tantamount to not answering the question.

The following is a high-scoring response demonstrating a justified preference.

Locke's view of the distinction between animal and person is more compelling than Hume's as he accounts for our experience of rationality. Thus, we can hold a person morally responsible for their actions as we assume their volition and reasoning, while we cannot punish an animal, such as a shark, for its actions which are fuelled by different mental capacities.

Question 3a.

Marks	0	1	Average
%	45	55	0.6

It was clear from the number of students who did not respond to this question that many were unfamiliar with the term 'habituation' despite the fact that this is an explicit concept that Aristotle develops over several sections of *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Book I, Section 9, and Book II, Sections 1–4). This uncertainty led to many responses of a general nature that failed to precisely explain the role of habituation in the good life.

At its most basic, habituation, according to Aristotle, is a necessary pursuit in the development of a virtuous character. One must cultivate good habits, which are those that direct us towards virtuous action and away from the more base instinctual life of animals. For Aristotle's good life philosophy, this is essential knowledge. It bridges the gap between his argument that man's function is to reason and pursue virtue, and the rationale of finding the mean between excess and vice. Good habits effectively direct our lives and allow us to more efficiently do virtuous deeds and be virtuous in the way that we do them.

The following high-scoring response clearly shows that the student understands the link between virtue and habituation, although the phrasing could have been more explicit.

Aristotle argues that in order to live a good life one must make a habit of acting in accordance with virtue.

Question 3b.

Marks	0	1	2	Average
%	48	26	26	0.8

Question 3b. required students to make a judgment call regarding Aristotle's understanding of the role habituation plays in a good life and to follow that with clear justification for their judgment. No marks were awarded for merely agreeing or disagreeing with Aristotle, as such a response requires no knowledge of the study design or the relevant philosophical concepts.

There were many students who effectively built upon Aristotle's work, highlighting how developing a habituated lifestyle would effectively lead one on a journey of continuous improvement. Others attacked Aristotle's position by exploring the vagueness of the guidelines Aristotle suggests and asserted, with some development, how a person might pursue a good life more effectively through other, more explicit, means.

The following is an example of a high-scoring and well-reasoned response.

While I agree that virtuous behaviours can be learned through habit I disagree that virtue itself can be gained in this way. Aristotle himself states that true virtue requires one to be virtuous for the sake of being virtuous, and from this they will attain pleasure through virtue. However, if one naturally does not like green vegetables, while they can make a habit of eating them in order to stay healthy or be polite, they can never learn to like the food and thus eat it for its own sake. I believe Aristotle's view can be objected to on the same grounds. While one can learn to act virtuously, they can never learn to be virtuous for the sake of virtue, instead doing it possibly because they believe it will lead to a good life.

Question 4

Marks	0	1	2	Average
%	34	38	28	1

In order to develop a strong response to this question, students needed to extrapolate reasoning from Nietzsche's philosophy supporting the superiority of the master morality. While Nietzsche never explicitly gives an argument for the superiority of master morality, he certainly implies it through his scathing commentary on the slave morality and his robust support for the characteristics cultivated by the master.

However, it is worth noting that many students merely outlined various qualities of either the master or slave morality without drawing the ideas together into an expression of the superiority of the master. Responses of this kind could not achieve full marks, as they did not fully address the question. Similarly, merely listing the qualities of the slave morality without any elaboration on their relationship to the master morality was considered a misreading of the question and could not be awarded marks.

The following is an example of a high-scoring response.

Nietzsche deems master morality to be superior because masters, unlike slaves (or, 'herd men') are not afraid of suffering. Masters face, and embrace, suffering and fear in order to become stronger and reach the noble virtues – qualities like rapacity, cunning, craft. However, slaves spend their lives fearing suffering, and simply comply with or enforce convention due to their inability or reluctance to embrace suffering. Thus, slaves aren't able to improve and progress.

Question 5

Marks	0	1	2	3	Average
%	58	17	13	12	0.8

Students did not handle Question 5 well, with the majority of responses failing to identify a difference between Nietzsche's and Callicles's views on the role of social convention in the good life. Many ignored the role of social convention entirely; these responses could not be awarded any marks.

Examples of genuine differences are:

- Callicles argues for the rejection of social convention on the grounds that it is a rejection of natural law, while Nietzsche argues that there is no value to convention or any form of law/social regulation.
- Social convention, according to Callicles, is the physical restriction of the man who can (has the power to) fulfil his desires, while for Nietzsche it is the psychological restriction of the individual pursuit of greatness.
- Social convention is developed out of fear according to Nietzsche and through spite according to Callicles.
- Callicles views social convention as the efforts of the weak to control the strong, whereas Nietzsche sees it as more than the mere restriction of strength but rather the effort to destroy all that is potentially glorious in man.

The following high-scoring response clearly identifies a point of difference between Callicles and Nietzsche:

Nietzsche & Callicles differ on the role of social convention in their identification of society's universal values. Callicles claims that the majority of society/herd enforces values such as "equality" in order to prevent the strong few from taking what is theirs. Nietzsche reasons that the herd is not enforcing values for this reason, but to impose a psychological dominance in

order to preserve its own safety and comfort, and eradicate anything that threatens the herd (such as suffering and pain).

Question 6

Marks	0	1	2	Average
%	16	42	42	1.3

Many students answered this question well. Students were able to draw out the analogy between the child drowning in the pond and an observer's response to the situation with the parallel that Singer wants to draw to suffering around the world. Additionally, students regularly managed to identify the moral conclusion that proximity should play no role in the impetus to help those in need, or that if it is within our power to help someone without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance then we ought, morally, to do it.

This being said, there were still students who were confused about what the question was asking. Merely outlining the drowning child example is not the same as drawing out the analogy that Singer wants to make. In the same vein, mentioning that Singer wants people to help others is not in the strictest sense the actual moral conclusion of this analogy.

The following is an example of a high-scoring response.

Singer puts forward an analogy whereby a child is drowning and a person passing by has to decide to either sacrifice their expensive shoes or pants and save the child or allow them to drown. He does this to outline that it is considered uncontroversial that a person should indeed ruin their expensive materials in order to save the child's life. This allows Singer to argue that likewise, it should also be uncontroversial to sacrifice luxury in order to help prevent famine and so he establishes that it is our obligation to prevent suffering if that is possible without sacrificing anything of morally comparable importance.

Section B

Most students attempted both questions and demonstrated some detailed and insightful knowledge of the texts involved. Many students opted to merely explain as much as they could about the appropriate philosophers; however, this was a tactic that was generally not awarded marks, considering the precision required in the extended responses in Section B. Many of the common errors in this section were the result of poor understanding of the requirements of the question.

Question 1

Marks	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Average
%	20	13	13	11	10	9	8	5	5	4	2	3.4

There were many aspects to Question 1 and producing a high-scoring response to this question required precise identification of all of those aspects. It was clear that many students were thrown by the apparent focus on 'classical philosophy' in the Armstrong quote. This led to some confusion about Armstrong's ideas regarding the understanding of the mind as an 'inner arena'. Armstrong clearly defines the mind as an inner arena on several occasions within his text, but not in the same vein as classical philosophers. Students were often vague in their expression of Armstrong's conception of the inner arena. Extended discussion of Armstrong's stance on the value of the scientific method was quite common, but it was largely inappropriate unless this discussion was ultimately directed towards the revelation of the mind as an inner arena of the central nervous system; whereas students who utilised Armstrong's 'driving example' as a means to explain the nature of the inner arena were well positioned to provide an insightful discussion of whether or not his viewpoint was the most plausible. This was similar for students who discussed the 'brittle glass' analogy as a means to demonstrate the qualities of the inner arena.

Also, students were often unclear about how best to characterise either Descartes's or Socrates's understanding of the inner arena. For both, the inner arena is a process by which a metaphysical thing (the mind, or soul) operates through the physical body. Neither Descartes nor Socrates envisioned the inner arena as a physical product of the body, but rather as the space occupied by that which cannot be known by the physical.

On top of all this, the question itself was a request for a judgment call on the student's behalf: Is the mind best thought of as an 'inner arena'? As such, students who merely outlined both Armstrong and Descartes's or Socrates's understanding of the nature of the mind were neither answering the proposed question nor providing critical discussion of a relevant judgment call and thus could not be awarded many marks.

It was apparent that students were uncertain as to the difference between a relevant contemporary debate and a contemporary example. An example – such as the citizenship recently granted to the machine 'Sophia' in Saudi Arabia – is different to the debate that is raised by such an example – in this case, the comparable qualities of the mind of a machine and those attributed to a human. On many occasions students provided relevant examples but neglected to extrapolate from them the contemporary debate.

Lastly, critical discussion requires students to consider the various merits and limitations of the positions on offer – in this case, whether or not the mind should be conceived of as an inner arena and which conception, if any, is most satisfactory. General and simplistic assertions with minimal development or use of the relevant contemporary debate too often resulted in responses with limited scope and depth.

The following is an example of a high-scoring response.

Is the mind an "inner arena"? According to Armstrong, the mind is only an inner arena if that arena is physical in nature. He reasons that in order to determine the nature of the mind, we should appeal to science, as it achieves consensus amongst a learned community. Science gives an account of the mind in purely physical terms, and so Armstrong reasons that such an account is the complete account. Since Armstrong reasons that mental states are causal states, and that science gives an account of causal states as the physical states of the central nervous system (CNS), the mind is simply the CNS. Under this model, consciousness is just another physical state of the brain that is able to scan itself. If one accepted this view of the mind, would artificially intelligent robots exhibiting thinking behaviour have minds? On face value, there seems to be nothing preventing these robots from possessing a mind, since both are physical. Yet, we can never be sure if robots are conscious, that they are thinking, since consciousness is unlike all other physical states, since it may scan itself. This perhaps suggests that mind is found in organic matter, rather than artificially synthesised matter. I find Armstrong's account of mind compelling, as although his appeal to science is flawed, recent discoveries in neuroscience suggest more & more that the mind and its thoughts may be understood physically. Descartes would agree that the mind is an "inner arena", but he would disagree on its essential nature. He reasons that the body, including the brain, is dubious, as it uses the senses which are deceptive (eg. straight sticks appearing bent in water). The only thing he knows with certainty is his existence when he is conscious of his thoughts. Thus, Descartes conceives of two worlds – the thinking world (mind) and the extended one (body). He reasons that he may conceive of his mind with certainty without his body, but cannot conceive of his body without mind. Since what he can doubt is not the same as what he cannot doubt, Descartes concludes that the mind is substantially different to the body, and that the latter is immaterial. This suggests that thinking robots, which are presumably entirely physical, may not possess a mind, which is immaterial. However, I do not find Descartes' argument convincing, as he gives no role to the brain in thinking. Yet, given that severe brain injuries can impair our thinking, the brain is an undoubtedly important instrument of thought, and thus the mind. Consequently, I agree that the mind is an "inner arena", as long as that arena is a physical one.

Question 2

Marks	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Average
%	23	16	12	10	8	9	7	7	5	2	1	3.1

Question 2 of Section B was not handled particularly well. Students were often confused by the Locke quote and struggled to unpack exactly where it fit within Locke's understanding of personal identity. Because of this, many responses to this question delivered unfocused descriptions of Locke's definition of the difference between person and man. Responses of this kind failed to acknowledge the second half of the quote, which links the notion of a person to the responsibility inherent in individual actions.

Higher-scoring responses to this explanatory part of the question relied heavily on Locke's 'drunkard' example, although some students also extrapolated the nature of responsibility from other arguments developed by Locke. The breadth of the question required much more than explanation and this is where most answers fell short. The term 'evaluate' was either ignored or misunderstood. Evaluation requires a student to consider the merits and limitations of a particular argument or position.

As such, in the case of this question, students were required to consider the value of Locke's efforts to link continuity of consciousness over time supported by memory to the problem of crime and punishment.

In addition to explaining Locke's position and evaluating its merits and limitations, students were required to make some reference to the views of either Hume or Nagasena. Many students had a firm grasp of Nagasena's position on the role of identity in crime and punishment. References to Nagasena's 'mangoes' were usually appropriate and well detailed, and there was some use of the Buddhist's views on the transition from 'milk, to curds, to butter, to ghee' in the explanation of dharma and its causal properties. Hume was utilised less often and students who used him well were forced to extrapolate a definitive position on crime and punishment despite a constantly shifting personal identity.

Higher-scoring responses to this question did more than merely demonstrate a student's understanding of the various ideas and concepts required, but managed to link those ideas together and leverage the views of either Hume or Nagasena to create a sophisticated and insightful deconstruction of the implications of Locke's position.

The following is a high-scoring example of a concise yet well-focused response.

In order to show that 'same person' is constituted by a continuity of consciousness, Locke provides the example of a sleepwalker. It would seem inappropriate to blame a waking person for the actions of their sleepwalking self, as they were not conscious of doing them. Thus, someone's identity and therefore legal responsibilities is dependent on their memory and consciousness, making 'person' a 'forensic term': Persons are the entities which we hold to praise or blame for actions as they are the ones have the consciousness required to commit actions.

I find Locke's use of memory as a criterion for personal identity problematic, however. In order for a person to have memory of an event, they must be the same person remembering it as the one that experienced the event, that is, for any mental state to be a memory there needs to be a continuity of personal identity between the event and the act of remembering it. As memory requires personal identity to exist, it cannot be used as the sole criterion for determining it, rendering Locke's reasoning circular. Thus, Locke's definition of person as a forensic term is problematic.

While Locke argues that 'persons' are what we praise and blame, Nagasena instead argues that there is no self at all. As a chariot is not constituted by one of its parts, or the sum of them,

or more than them, likewise the self is not constituted by any of the body parts, nor the sum of them, nor more than them, and this no self exists whatsoever. Instead Nagasena argues that someone is responsible for their actions if there is a causal chain of successive moments of consciousness that leads to the point of the crime, even though personal identity does not exist and they are neither the same nor different over time.

I find Nagasena's view of non-self, unconvincing, however, as he gives no justification as to why one cannot accept a reductionist position on the nature of self from his reasoning. The self could very well be the 'sum of the parts of the body', with this seeming intuitively plausible. Thus Nagasena's argument that no self exists and legal responsibility should be determined by causal association with the crime is difficult to accept.

Section C

Question chosen	none	1	2	3
%	1	35	39	25

Marks	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Average
%	3	4	4	5	8	7	8	8	8	7	6	6	5	4	5	3	3	2	2	1	1	8.4

This section of the examination provided opportunity for extensive philosophical exposition. Students with a detailed understanding of the arguments put forward by philosophers from the selected readings were well positioned to develop insightful and well-rounded explorations of the diverse topics. There was also ample opportunity for students to draw on material beyond the set texts, and many students made use of relevant contemporary issues.

In many cases, students wrote essays that were overly explanatory, demonstrating an ability to recall information or reiterate various philosophers' views, without ever developing a line of discussion. Each of the essay topics was framed to require students to genuinely consider an argumentative stance on the issue in question and to relate all of their writing to the construction and support of that stance. However, many essays were used as an opportunity to express the views and values of the set readings, with little supporting discussion why the selected references are important despite their limitations.

Many students who chose to respond to Question 1 clearly understood how best to direct their discussion, focusing on the division between self-preservation and the ability to help those in need. There was still a lot of misinterpretation, resulting in essays that simply questioned whether or not helping others is important. Such a discussion did little to explore 'how much is enough' and often led to responses that struggled to remain relevant to the central concerns of the question. It is also worth noting that in responding to this question, students were not required to specifically refer to Oscar Schindler and his efforts but rather to consider them a historical example of how one might measure the help of others.

For Question 2, the meaning of 'biggering' in reality was left for students to determine through an unpacking of the extract from *The Lorax*, and it was clear that most students understood it as a basic stand-in for excessive consumption of goods or the extension of personal value through increased collection or development of stuff. This question was the most popular choice. Students utilised the children's text to draw out their ideas about the relationship of such a viewpoint to reality. The length of the extract allowed students to adjust their focus according to what suited them, looking at either the impact of such a mindset on others and the world, or detailing the psychological greed of the need for more. No matter how students decided to approach the question itself, the important task was to develop and support a position on the central question.

Merely stating that the unrestrained consumption of goods is either good or bad neglects the concern of whether such a process is 'key' to the good life.

Lastly, Question 3 was also a popular choice. Students were often insightful and poignant in their discussion of the cartoon but regularly ignored the actual prompt of the question. The question directed students to specifically unpack the experience of the human in Brad McMillan's image, but many students instead chose to merely interpret the cartoon as a damning commentary on technology. This is not to say that an essay that explored the potentially damning relationship that people have with technology was the wrong path to follow, but rather that technology, in and of itself, was not the question's central concern. Instead, students were being asked to consider specifically whether the human in the image was living a good life; hence, the technological component of the image was secondary to the state of the human in question. Considerations of the hold social media has over human attention or the regression of mankind as a result of the digital outsourcing of knowledge and memory are examples of well-focused approaches.

The following is the first half of a well-developed, high-scoring response to Question 2.

While "biggering" in terms of consumerist consumption disregards the moral obligations that we have to others, as Singer demonstrates in the drowning boy analogy, ultimately morality is an insufficient account for what constitutes a good life, as it fails to encompass situations where morality is not present or applicable. Thus, because this demonstrates how the criteria for a good life can be altered dependent on circumstance, it substantiates Nietzsche's claim that there is no universalised outline for living a good life, and to live well is in fact dependent on the individual. As a result, "biggering" can be considered the key to the good life where it grants the individual the ability to fulfil their own personal self-development and potential.

"Biggering" in terms of increasing consumeristic or materialistic wealth fails to acknowledge our moral obligations to other. As Singer argues in the drowning boy analogy: If I were to be walking through a park and come across a young boy drowning in a pond, and I had the capacity to save him with no comparable moral sacrifice of my own, then I am immoral for not acting to save him. When applied to the real world, the consequences of this is that if we are aware of suffering, such as a famine crisis in Syria, and we can provide assistance with no comparable sacrifice of our own (the money sacrificed through donations is comparatively insignificant to someone dying of starvation) then we are morally obliged to do so. If we accept our responsibility to the drowning boy in the analogy then we must equally accept our subsequent real world obligations. Thus, if we use our money to 'bigger' our houses or cars or other comparatively insignificant things, we are acting immorally.

Criticisms can be made in order to try and diminish these obligations, however ultimately our responsibility to donate excess money and goods to provide assistance to alleviate suffering remains. For example, someone might protest that donations may be misused by untrustworthy organisations, and therefore we should be able to keep it in order to 'bigger' our own lives. However, if I happened to be riding my bike when I witnessed the boy drowning, and it was well known that a gang of bicycle thieves operated in this park and my bike would certainly be stolen (a far greater chance of it being stolen than of money being misused by charities) it is still of less comparable significance to the child's life. Therefore, I am still morally obliged to save the child's life, and in the same way we are still obliged to provide monetary assistance to those who are suffering in an attempt of alleviation.